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Inprovidingpolicy  advice  andsupportof  investmentprojects  for
commodities  such as cocoa, the donor community  should  take
into account  the effects  on, and  possible  reactions  of, the other
countries  producing  that  commodity.
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This paper-  a product of the Trade and Policy Division, Country Economics Department-  is part of a
larger PRE effort to examine the question of whether the simultaneous expansion of exports by several
developing countries would lead to a decline in their terms of trade, export revenues, and real income.
Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
Sheila Fallon, room N10-025, extension 38009 (37 pages, with tables).
It has often been argued that if several develop-  return on the new investments for Africa as a
ing countries expand exports, they are likely to  whole would be positive - although signifi-
experience a decline in their terms of trade,  cantly lower than returns for the country in
export revenues, and real incomes. The general  which the new investments were made.
case for this export pessimism has lost much of
its force, but remains very much alive for some  Panagariya and Schiff:
specific countries and commodities - particu-
larly the export from Africa of cocoa, coffee, and  *  Examine how real incomes and tax and
tea, which exhibit low price elasticity.  export revenues compare under existing and
some alternative (Nash, myopic) taxes.
Panagariya and Schiff systematically analyze
this issue for cocoa, a commodity for which  *  Analyze the impact of export expansion
many African countries have a large share in  (through increased efficiency) on real income,
world exports.  Their concern is chiefly with the  export revenues, and tax revenues, under altema-
problems that arise from low price elasticity of  tive tax regimes.
demand in the world market and their implica-
tions for trade policy.  *  Compare the effects of export expansion by
African countries with that by non-African
They find that increasing productivity in one  countries.
African country through new investments would
benefit that country - but the other African  Their results - highly tentative - are based
countries would lose.  On the whole the African  on calibrated equilibria that use specific func-
countries would gain, however, so the gains to  tional forms and existing point estimates of
the country with expanded output would domi-  various elasticities.
nate the losses for the other countries. The
The PRE Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way in the Bank's  Policy,  Research,  and External
Affairs  Complex.  An  objective  of the  series  is  to get  these  fmdings  out  quickly,  even  if presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.
The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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*  Paper prepared for the World Bank Africa Economic  Issues Conference, Nairobi,
Kenya, June 1990.t.OMNODITY  EXPORTS  AND REAL  INCOME  IN  AFRICA  *
I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  The  Problem
This  paper  is  part of a  project  whose  principal  objective  is to
address  the  frequent  concern  that  a simultaneous  expansion  of  exports  by
several  developing  countries  is likely  to lead  to a decline  in their
terms  of trade,  export  revenues  and real  income. This  concern  dominated
the  writings  of  development  economists  during  the  1950s  and  has  kept
resurfacing  in one  context  or another  ever  since. The  essential
argument  as  expounded  in  the  early  writings  - e.g.,  Prebisch  1950,  - was
that  exports  of developing  countries  consisted  mainly  of primary
products  for  which  world  demand  was inelastic. Therefore,  any
productivity  gains  in exportables  were likely  to  be passed  on to
importing  countries  via a change  in the  terms  of trade  favorable  to the
latter. Thxere  was little  to be gained  by relying  on exports  as the
engine  of growth.
A numbe;  of economists,  including  Krueger  (1961),  Cairncross
(1962),  Keesing  (1967),  Balassa  (1978)  and  Bhagwati  (1978,  1988),
refuted  the  wisdom  of this  export  pessimism. In  particular,  the  recent
paper  by Bhagwati  (1988)  provides  a comprehensive  review  of the
controversy  and  makes  a convincing  case  that  the  fears  of elasticity
*  We would  like  to thank  Shantayanan  Devarajan  for  useful  comments  and
Brendan  Kennelly  for  excellent  research  assistance.2
pessimists,  old  as  well as  new, ar.e  ill  founded. Among  other  things,  he
points  to the  phenomenal  growth  of exports  and  incomes  of  many East
Asian  countries  to counter  export  pessimists.  He also  argues  that  the
dramatic  shift  in  the  export  composition  of developing  countries  toward
manufactures  and  the  potential  for  intraindustry  specialization  provide
further  reasons  why the  world  demand  is unlikely  to  be a  b'nding
constraint  in  the future.
The  general  case for  export  pessimism  bas lost  much of its  force,
at least  for  now.  Concerns  have remained  very  much alive,  however,  with
respect  to some  specific  countries  and  commodities. Thus,  fears
continue  to  be expressed  that  a simultaneous  expansion  of exports  of
certain  commodities  (e.g.,  cocoa,  coffee  and  tea)  by several  African
countries,  most recently  resulting  from  the  adoption  of structural
adjustment  programs,  may lead  to  a decline  in the  real  incomes  and
exports  revenues  of the  countries.  These  fears  have been sufficiently
serious  that  since  1968  the  World  Bank  has  had special  lending
guidelines  for  commodities  such  as  coffee,  cocoa  and  tea.  Batk  policy
is  to deny  lending  for  output  expansion  of these  commodities,  unless  the
country  has no  viable  economic  alternative  or if  the  country  has
suffered  a recent  loss  in  production  due  to climatic  or other  reasons.
Concerns  regarding  possible  harmful  effects  of commodity  export
expansion  have reemerged  recently  in the  context  of structural
adjustment  both  within  and  outside  the  Bank.  For  instance,  such
concerns  were raised  recently  in the  German  parliament  which,  in turn,3
prompted  the  German  Executive  Director  at the  World  Bank to send  the
following  query  to the  World  Bank's  Chief  Economist  for  Africa:
"In  the  framework  of structural  adjustment  programs,  many  African
countries  endeavor  to increase  their  exports  of agricultural
products. An increased  supply  of goods  may soon  lead  to price
declines  of the  correspondent  products,  so  that  additional
revenues  may  not  be realized. How  does  the  World  Bank  justify  its
correspondent  policy  advice? What can  be done  to avoid  the
negative  results?"
A similar  sentiment  has  been  expressed  by Professor  H.f!.  Singer  in
an exchange  with  Mr. C. Humphreys  in  the  December  1989  issue  of Finance
and  Development. Professor  Singer  asserts  that  the "adverse  changes  in
terms  of trade,  far  from  being  'exogenous',  are  related  to the  export
expansion.  . . recommended  simultaneously  to indebted  countries". In
response,  Mr. Humphreys  writes  that  the  argument  of the  negative  effect
on the  terms  of trade  of export  expansion  is  weak,  and  suggests  that
Africa  should  raise  productivity  in its  traditional  exports,  diversify
its  export  base,  and  expand  proauction  of imported  commodities. Perhaps
there  is some  truth  in  both  views  but  without  systematic  analysis  we
cannot  reach  a consensus.
The recent  World  Bank  Board  paper wStrengthening  Trade  Policy
Reform"  also  emphasizes  the  need for  studying  the  effects  of increased
commodity  exports  on the  terms  of trade  and  real  incomes  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa. Similarly,  the  study  on Africa  by Landell-Mills,  Agarwala  and
Please,  "Sub-Saharan  Africa: From  Crisis  to Sustainable  Growth"  n3tes4
that  some  of the  poorest  African  countries  have  been  hit  hardest  by
adversA  terms  of trade  changes  over  the  past 30  years.
chese  examples  show  that  the  fears  raised  by elasticity  pessimists
are  very  much alive  in Lie  context  of  African  commodity  exports. The
problem  is  viewed  as  being  especially  serious  for  countries  whose
exports  are  concentrated  in  commodities  that  are  said  to exhibit  low
import  demand  elasticities  (e.g.,  Cote  d'Ivoire  which  exports  coffee  and
cocoa). Rhetoric  has  been strong  on the  part  of proponents  as  well as
opponents  of pessimism. But  evidence  provided  to  date on  either  side  is
sketchy. We believe  that  therc  is  a real  need to study  the  issue  in
depth  and  understand  whether  the  export  pessimists  are  justified  and  if
so  what can  be done  to  maximize  these  countries'  gains  from  exports.
The  present  paper  is  a first  effort  in this  direction.
Given  the  low  price  elasticity  of  world  import  demand,  an increase
in  exports  of coffee,  cocoa  and  tea  will lead  to lower  overall  export
revenues. However,  some  countries  may gain.  The  distribution  of gains
and  losses  are  examined  in  detail  in  the  paper.
A central  premise  behind  the  paper  is  that  domestic-policy
instruments  should  be employed  to  promote  efficiency  at home  while  trade
policy  instruments  should  be used  to deal  with problems  related  to
foreign  demand. 1 Thus,  the  policy  measures  designed  to correct  domestic
price  distortions  and  real  wage and  exchange  rate  misalignment  are  well
advised. The issue  which  deserves  closer  scrutiny,  however,  is  whether
1 This view derives  from the theory  of the second  best  which emphasizes  that
distortions  should  be attacked  at the  source. See  Bhagwati  (1971)  for  further
details.5
the  current  trade  taxes  adequately  handle  the  problems  which  arise  from
1'-j  demand  elasticities  in the  world  market.
There  are  two  analytically  distinct  sources  of terms  of trade
deterioration:  exogenous  deterioration  due to low  income  elasticity  of
demand  and  endogenous  deterioration  resulting  from  increased
productivity.  In the  latter  case,  increased  productivity  may  be
accompanied  by a decline  in income  and  export  revenues  if  the  price
elasticity  cf demand  is low. Our  concern  here is solely  with the
problems  which  arise  from  a low  price  elasticity  of demand  in  the  world
market  and  their  implications  for  trade  policy. Problems  which  arise
from  low  income  elasticity  do  not  require  policy  intervention  and  will
not concern  us  here. 2
Given  a low  price  elasticity,  problems  can  arise  at  both the
national  and  international  level. Thus,  export  expansion  by one  country
affects  not only  its  own  income  but  that  of the  other  countries  as  well.
In  particular,  if export  expansion  is  the  result  of increased
productivity,  the  country  expanding  exports  is likely  to gain  while  the
other  exporters  will lose. The  project  will stt  the  effects  at both
levels.
In this  vein,  we would  like  to seek  answers  to the  following
questions  in this  project:
1.  What is  the  likelihood  that  export  expansion  resulting
from  better  and  fuller  use  of resources  can lead  to  a
decline  in real  incomes  and  export  revenues  in  African  and
non-African  countries? For  which  commodities  is  this
2  See  Bhagwati  (1988)  on this  issue.6
outcome  plausible? What are  the  key  parameters  determining
the  impact  of export  expansion  or.  the  terms  of trade,  export
earnings  and real  incomes?
2.  Will further  reductions  in  export  taxes  lead  to an
increase  or decrease  in real  incomes? What  will be the
impact  of tax  reductions  on tax  revenues  and  output
quantities?
3.  Empirically,  how important  is  the issue  of
interdependence?  For instance,  while  considering  a further
tax  reduction  on cocoa,  should  Ghana  pay  attention  to policy
changes  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Malaysia? In  which
commodities,  if  any,  does  interdependence  play  an important
role?
4.  Can  countries  realize  most  of the  gains  from  trade  by
choosing  taxes  optimally  in  an independent  fashion?
In terms  of development  of theory,  we should  note  that  the issue
of income-  and  revenue-maximizing  exports  taxes  when two  or  more
countries  compete  against  each  other  in  the  world  market  for  the  same
commodity  has simply  not  been  studied. The  traditional  literature  deals
with the situation  in  which  two  countries  choose  taxes  cn each  other's
exports  so  as to  maximize  income  (welfare)  or revenue 3.
3  For  example,  see  the  classic  article  by  Johnson  (1954)  and  the  more  modern
treatment  in  Dixit  and  Norman  (1980,  Ch.  6).7
B.  Relevan.  Commodities  and  Countries
Commodities  that  concern  us  must satisfy  two  important  criteria.
First,  they  must account  for  a significant  share  of exports  of one  or
more  African  countries. Second,  African  countries  must  have a large
share  in the  world  market  for  those  commodities.  The six  most important
commodities  based  on these  criteria  are  cocoa,  coffee,  tea,  cotton,
tobacco  and  groundnuts.  Of these,  the  first  three  - cocoa,  coffee  and
tea  - are  exported  exclusively  by developing  countries  while the  last
three  are  exported  by both  developing  and  developed  countries.
Developing  countries  do not import  cocoa  at all  and  account  for  only  7.9
percent  of net imports  of coffee. The  remaining  commodities  are
imported  by developing  countries  in large  volume  both in absolute  and
relative  terms.
Africa's  share  in the  world  market  for  cocoa  is larger  than  that
for  any  of the  other  commodities. C8te  d'Ivoire  and  Ghana  each  has a
large  share  in the  world  market  and  depends  heavily  on this  commodity
for  export  receipts. The two  countries  also  raise  substantial  tax
revenues  from  this  commodity. Coffee  is  the  next  most important
commodity  for  Africa. Once  again,  C8te  d'Ivoire  is the  largest  African
exporter. In terms  of  export  share  for  Africa,  tea  ranks  behind  coffee,
with  Kenya  being  the  largest  -;frican  exporter.
Our  focus  in this  paper  is  on cocoa. Cocoa  is  not only  the  most
important  commodity  export  from  Africa,  but it also  provides  a clean
case  in that  it is exported  exclusively  by developing  countries  and
imported  exclusively  by developed  countries. Tea  and  coffee,  on the
other  hand,  are  also  imported  by some  developing  countries  and raise8
complex  distributional  issues  within  developing  countries. These
commodities  will  be examined  at a later  stage.
Cocoa  is  exported  in large  amounts  by  non-African  countries  as
well.  We will incorporate  explicitly  these  non-African  countries  into
the  analysis. This  will  allow  us to examine  the  impact  on  African
countries  of changes  uccurring  outside  Africa,  and  vice versa.
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows. In Section
II,  we outline  the  model  and  its  application  to cocoa. In Section  III,
we present  results  of a  number  of simulations.  Finally,  in Section  IV,
we conclude  the  paper.
II.  THE  MODEL
Our  model  consists  of a  multi-countrv  demand-supply  system  for  the
commodity  examined. The  effects  of  adjustment  programs  are  captured  by
parameters  of the  supply  function. For instance,  improvements  in
productive  efficiency  via  fuller  and  better  use  of resources  are
represented  by shifts  in  the  intercept  and/or  slope  parameters. 4
Within  a partial  equilibrium  framework,  the  principal  theoretical
issue  is the  determination  of income-  and  revenue-maximizing  export
taxes  when two  or more  countries  compete  against  each  other  in the  world
market. Although  there  is  a large  body  of literature  on optimal  trade
taxes,  the  issue  of how such  taxes  are  determined  when two  or more
countries  compete  against  one  another  >  s simply  not  been  addressed. In
4  If  we feel  that  general  equilibrium  analysis  may  be  useful,  we  will  engage
in such  an  exercise  in the  future. This  may be the  case  if  we want to include
the implicit  tax on exports  due to tariffs  on imported  manufactures  (Lerner
Symmetry  Theorem).9
this  set-up  strategic  considerations  inevitably  -ome  into  play.
Fortunately,  there  have  been important  deverlopments  in  the  area  of
strategic  trade  policy  in recent  years  which  allow  us to address  the
problem  in a reasonable  way. 5
The  analytic  solution  for  income-  and revenue-maximizing  export
taxes  for  several  countries  who  compete  in  the  world  market  is  provided
in Panagariya  and  Schiff  (1990). Below,  we present  a brief  diagrammatic
exposition  of the  basic  model  and  its  application  to cocoa. In the
following  section,  we present  the simulation  results  with actual  and
income-maximizing  taxes. Simulation  exercises  with revenue  - maximizing
taxes  will  be taken  up at  a later  stage.
The  basic  st:ucture  of the  problem  can  be explained  conveniently
with the  help  of a three-country  setup. Denote  the  three  countries  by
A, B  and  C and  assume  that  the  former  two  export  cocoa  to the  latter.
Assume  that  exporters  do not  consume  and  the  importer  does  not produce
cocoa.  Individual  producers  and  consumers  are  perfectly  competitive.
Each  exporting  country's  governmer.L  chooses  the  export  tax  so  as to
maximize  the  country's  profits  taking  the  other  exporting  country's  tax
rate  as given. This  behavioral  assumption  leads  to  what is  called  the
Nash  equilibrium  in  the  game  theory  literature. 6
Consider  country  A's problem. For  a given  export  tax  by B, say
tB,  A's government  must choose  tA so  as to  maximize  profits  from
exports. We can  obtain  the  excess  demand  facing  A by subtracting  B's
5 For a survey  of recent  game theory  models, see Dixit (1986)  and  the
references  therein.
6  We assume  that  the  importer,  C, does  not levy  import  tariffs.10
supply  from  the  world (i.e.,  country  C's)  demand. This  excess  demand
curve  is represented  by DA(tB)  in  Figure  1.  Coresponding  to  DA,  we can
draw  a  marginal  revenue  curve,  MRA.
We assume  thEt  the  supply  curve,  SA,  reflects  the  true  marginal
social  costs  of producing  cocoa  in  A.  Then  the  country's  income-
maximizing  equilibrium  will coincide  with the  profit-maximizing
equilibrium. This  equilibrium  is  given  by the  intersection  of SA  with
the  MRA curve. The  corresponding  world  and  domestic  prices  are  given  by
pW and  PA and  the  difference  between  them,  pW - PA =  tAPW,  equals  the
per-unit  export  tax.  Tax  revenue  and  producers'  surplus,  respectively,
are  given  by PWNMPA  and  PAME.  In this  paper,  we will refer  to the  sum
of these  areas  as the  country's  profits  from  cocoa  exports.
An increase  in tB shifts  B's  supply  curve (not  shown  in Figure  1)
to  the left  and  hence  .,s excess  demand  curve  to the  right. This  causes
the  optimal  tA  to change. It is  easily  shown  that  as tB rises,  the
optimal  tA also  rises. Moreover,  A's profits  associated  with the  higher
(tA,  tB)  combination  are  higher  as  well.
In Figure  2, curve  RA shows  country  A's optimal  tax rate  for
different  values  of tB.  In Panagariya  and  Schiff  (1990),  we demonstrate
that  if demand  and  supply  curves  are  linear,  the  shape  of RA  must be as
shown  in Figure  2.  Analogously  to  RA,  we can  derive  RB  which shows  the
optimal  values  of tB for  different  values  of tA.  We will refer  to RA
and  RB as reaction  curves  and  to the  point  of their  intersection,  N, as
the  Nash  equilibrium.
Suppose  that  B's  tax  happens  to  be t1B.  The  corresponding  optimal
tax  for  A, as shown  by its  reaction  curve  RA,  will  be t1A. We refer  to11
t1A as  A's "myopic"  optimal  tax  to emphasize  that  t'A is optimal  only  if
A expects  B to continue  to  hold its  tax  at t'B. As RB shows,  when  A's
tax  is at tlA,  B's  income  - maximizing  tax  is lower  than  t'B  so that  the
latter  is  unlikely  to  hold its  tax  rate  at t'B.
For  any  given  value  of tA,  we can  also  define  a  myopic  optimal  tax
rate  for  country  B.  Thus,  if tA  =  t2A, B's  myopic  optimal  tax  rate  is
t2B.  As in the  previous  case,  if  B fixes  its  tax  at t2B, A will  want to
choose  a lower  tax  than  t2A.  It is  evident  that  only  at N is  A's tax
rate  optimal  given  B's  tax  rate  and  vice  versa.  In this  sense,  N is  the
Nash  equilibrium.
A final  point  which  deserves  noting  is that  it is  entirely
possible  that  the  profits  of both  A and  B can  be higher  at arbitrarily
chosen  tax  rates  (t 2At t1B) than  at  Nash  equilibrium. The  problem  with
these  arbitrary  rates  is,  of course,  that  at least  one  country  can
increase  its  income  by changing  the  tax  rate. Therefore,  the  arbitrary
rates  are  not sustainable  under  the  Nash assumption.  The lower  profits
at  N than  at some  higher  rates  is  simply  the  result  of "tax-competition'
between  the  two  countries.
In  our simulations,  we extend  the  above  model  to  allow  for  nine
exporters. These  exporters  are  Cameroon,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghana  and
Nigeria  in  Africa,  Brazil  and  Ecuador  in  Latin  America,  Indonesia  and
Malaysia  in  Asia,  and  Oceania. Markets  are  assumed  to  be competitive  in
each  country,  and  domestic  consumption  is assumed  to  be zero. We derive
both the  myopic  optimal  export  taxes  and  Nash  export  taxes  for  each
country.12
We also  employ  the  model  to  perform  several  comparative  statics
exercises. We simulate  the  effects  of improvements  in production
efficiency  in  African  and  non-African  countries  on real  income  and  tax
revenues  in the  nine countries. The  simulations  are  done  both  when tax
rates  are  held  constant  and  when they  are  altered  endogenously  (Nash
taxes).
The  world  demand  and  country  supply  curves  have  been linearized  by
using  existing  elasticity  estimates  and  1986  prices  and  quantities.
Knowledge  of the  elasticities  is  not sufficient  to solve  for  the  tax
rates. The  exact  form  of the  various  functions  also  matters. For
instance,  several  studies  have  estimated  demand  functions  in log  form,
and  have  obtained  elasticity  estimates  smaller  than one. Clearly,  the
elasticity  cannot  be smaller  than  one  along  the entire  demand  curve  as
this  would  imply  an infinitely  high optimal  export  tax  at the  world
level.
The functional  form  is  a  matter  which  we plan to take  up in the
future. At this  stage,  we have  assumed  linear  curves,  which  in the  case
of -:he  demand  function  implies  finite  export  taxes. Our results  must
thus  be regarded  as being  preliminary.  More definite  results  must await
a  more careful  examination  of the  precise  form  of the  demand  and  supply
functions.
Trade  policy  interventions  should  be designed  not to serve  short-
term  stabilization  objectives,  but  rather  should  be implemented  in  order
to improve  the  long-term  efficiency  of resource  allocation  in those13
specific  cases  where  the  market  fails  to do so. 7 Hence,  long-term
elasticity  estimates  were used  as a  basis  for  linearizing  the  supply
functions. Thus,  the  simulations  performed  in the  following  section
should  be understood  as generating  comparisons  between  alternative  long-
run  equilibria  after  all relevant  planting  changes  have taken  place.
Moreover,  since  we are  concerned  with the long-run  we abstract
from  the  demand  for  stocks  and focus  on consumption  demand. We assume
for  simplicity  that  the  residual  output  exported  by the  small  producers
- those  not included  in  our  group  of  nine  major  producers  - is  given  and
does  not respond  to changes  in  the  world  price. We then  set  the  demand
at the  world  price  equal  to the  exports  of the  nine  major  producers.
Finally,  we abstract  at this  stage  from  the  possibility  of smuggling,
say  between  Ghana  and  Cote d'Ivoire. This  added  constraint  on the  power
of some  countries  to set  export  taxes  will be taken  up at a later  stage.
Table  1 presents  some  of the  basic  data  used in  the  analysis. The
output  levels  (in  thousands  of  metric  tons)and  the  shares  correspond  Lo
1986,  with the  Cote  d'Ivoire  at 585 (36Z),  Brazil  at 329 (20Z),  Ghana  at
219 (13Z),  Malaysia  at 125, (8Z),  Cameroon  at 118 (7%),  Nigeria  at 110
(7Z),  Ecuador  at 85 (5Z),  Indonesia  at 32 (2?),  and  Oceania  at 30 (2Z).
Table  1 also shows  the  1986  world  price,  tax  rate,8  and  domestic  prices,
the long-run  supply  elasticities  and  the  corresponding  slopes  and
intercepts  of the long-run  supply  curves.
7 Power  to affect  the price in the  market  for a country's  exports  of a
competitively  produced  commodity  is  a  case  where  optimal  export  taxes  will  raise
welfare  for  the  exporting  country.
8  The  tax  rates  correspond  to  1982  and  1983. Reliable  estimates  of  export
tax  rates  for  1986  were not  available.14
The  highest  export  tax  rate (702)  corresponded  to  Ghana,  followed
by Nigeria  (50%),  Cameroon  (40Z),  C8te  d'Ivoire  (25Z),  Brazil  (202),  and
a zero  tax  rate  for  Malaysia,  Ecuador,  Indonesia  and  Oceania. The  more
recent  producers,  Malaysia  and Indonesia,  have  a  high long-run  supply
elasticity  (3),  while  those  of traditional  producers  - like  Ghana
(0.71),  COte  d'Ivoire  (1.15),  Nigeria  (0.45)  and  Brazil  (0.58)  - are
significantly  lower.
World supply  is 1633  and  the  world  price  is 2070.  The  elasticity
of demand  is 0.4,  the intercept  is  2286.3  and  the  slope  is -315.6  M.T.
per  U.S.  dollar.
III.  SIMULATION  RESULTS
In this section,  we perform  five  sets  of simulations.  This  will
allow  us to examine  the  effects  of some  of the  recent  changes  in the
cocoa  market  under  actual  taxes  and  compare  them  with the  effects  in the
case  where  countries  choose  Nash taxes. We also  examine  the  effects
under "myopic"  taxes.
The  simulations  are  as follows:
1.  First,  we compare  outputs  and  profits  under  actual  taxes
with those  under  free  trade,  Nash  taxes  and  myopic  taxes.
(see  Tables  2  and  3).
2.  Second,  we simulate  an exogenous  outward  shift  in  Ghana's
supply  curve  of 100,000  tons (MT),  and  examine  the  results
under  actual  and  Nash  taxes  (see  Table  4).
3.  Third,  we simulate  an exogenous  shift  in  Malaysia's  supply
curve  of 100,000  M.T. (see  Table  5).
4.  Fourth,  we simulate  the  impact  of elimination  of the  export
tax in  Cote  d'Ivoire  (see  Table  6).
5.  Finally,  we simulate  the  impact  of 2-4  above  simultaneously
(see  Table  7).15
1.  Table  2 shows  the  tax  rates,  outputs  and  total  profits  (or  income)
under  actual  taxes  and  free  trade. The  results  on output  are  presented
in thousands  of  metric  tons,  and  those  on profits  (and  revenues  in the
other  tables)  are  in  millions  of  U.S.  dollars.
The  actual  world  price  is 2,070,  while  under  free  trade  it is
1,562  or 24.5  percent  lower. Hence,  output  falls  for  countries  with an
initial  tax  rate  below  24.5  percent  (all  five  Non-African  countries)  and
rises  in the  countries  with an initial  tax  rate  above  24.5  percent  (all
four  African  countries). The  fall  is largest  in the  countries  with  high
elasticity  (by  742  in  Malaysia,  75?  in Indonesia  and  77Z  in  Oceania).
Output  increases  by over  100  percent  in  Ghana (the  domestic  producer
price  increases  by over  150?,  from  621  to 1562,  and the  elasticity  is
.71). Africa's  output  increases  by over 30  percent  (from  1032  to 1349),
world  output  increases  by about  10  percent  (from  1633 to  1793),  and
Africa's  share  increases  from  63  percent  to 75  percent.
Profits,  on the  other  hand,  fall  everywhere. They  fall  most for
the  small  producers  with  elastic  supply  (by  93?  in  Malaysia,  by 93.6?  in
Indcnesia  and  by 94.5?  in  Oceania). The  fall  in  profits  is also
significant  in  COte  d'Ivoire  (42.6Z),  in  Cameroon  (37.7Z),  in  Brazil
(31.9Z),  in  Ecuador  (27.9Z)  and  in  Nigeria  (24.8Z). The  only  country
where the  fall  in  profits  is  negligible  is  Ghana. Both  the  actual  tax
rate  of 70  percent  and  the  zero  tax  rate  are sub  optimal. In fact,  we
show  below  that  the  optimal  (myopic  or  Nash)  tax  rate  lies  between  these
two  extremes.16
Profits  for  Africa  fall  from  1443  to 1043 (or  by 27.7Z),  and  world
profits  fall  from  2182  to 1512.3  (by  30.7Z). Thus,  even  though  Africa's
output  (and  share  in  world  output)  would  rise  under  free  trade,  it  would
come  at the  expense  of  a reduction  in  profits.
Table  3  presents  the  initial  results  with actual,  Nash  and  myopic
taxes.  Let  us first  consider  myopic  taxes. For  a given  country,  this
tax  is derived  by maximizing  profits  under  the  assumption  that  other
rates  are  held fixed  at their  current  (actual)  levels. In terms  of
Figire  2, if B's  tax  is frozen  at t'B,  A's  myopic  tax  is given  by tlA.
In Table  3, if  tax  rates  of countries  other  than  Cote  d'Ivoire  are  kept
at the levels  shown  in column  (1),  Cote  d'Ivoire's  (myopic)  optimal  tax
is  29.92  (column  2').  Similarly,  if tax  rates  of countries  other  than
Ghana  are  held at the  levels  shown  in  column  (1),  Ghana's  myopic  optimal
tax is  20.5Z (column  2').
In contrast  with  myopic  taxes,  Nash taxes  allow  other  countries  to
adjust  their  taxes  optimally. Thus,  for  each  country,  the  tax  rate  in
column  (2)  is  optimal  when other  countries  choose  tax  rates  at levels
shown  in the  same  column. In contrast  to  myopic  taxes,  Nash taxes  do
not leave  room  for  profit-increasing  changes  in tax  rates  for  any
country  as long  as the  others  keep  their  taxes  at Nash levels.
Not surprisingly,  as seen  by comparing  columns  (5)  and (6'),  each
country  taken  one  at a time  can  increase  its  profits  under  myopic  taxes.
But  while this  country  maximizes  profits,  others  do not  do so  under  the
myopic  tax  assumption.  Reactions  by others  will  eventually  lead  to the
Nash  equilibrium.17
The  most interesting  comparison  is  between  actual  and  Nash taxes.
A striking  result  here is that  profits  under  actual  taxes  are  higher
than  under  Nash  behavior  for  all  countries  except  Ghana. With  as many
as nine  participants  in the  market,  Nash  behavior  leads  to excessive  tax
competition  and  results  in lower  profits  for  all  participants  except
one. Also,  as expected,  profits  under  Nash  taxes  are larger  than  under
free  trade  for  all  countries  (compare  column  (5)  in  Table  2  and column
(6)  in Table  3).
The  world  price  under  Nash  taxes  is lower  by U.S. dollars  291  per
metric  ton (MT)  than  under  actual  taxes,  falling  from  2070  to 1779  or by
14.1  percent. This  is due  to the  substantial  fall  in tax  rates  for
several  producers: from  70%  to 19.5?  for  Ghana,  from  502  to 5.7?  for
Nigeria,  and from  40Z  to 8.2Z  for  Cameroon. These  lower  Nash  tax  rates
result  in substantially  higher  output  for  Ghana  (from  219  to 421),
Nigeria  (from  110  to 139),  and  Cameroon  (from  118  to 184).
The  Nash taxes  are somewhat  lower  than  actual  taxes  for  Brazil
(13.5?  versus  20?),  they  are  not  substantially  different  from  actual
taxes  for  Cote d'Ivoire  (25.2%  versus  25.1Z),  and  they  rise  from  zero  to
3.22  for  Ecuador,  to 2.8Z  for  Malaysia,  to .7Z  for  Indonesia  and  to .6?
for  Oceania. Cote d'Ivoire's  output  falls  by 16.32  (from  585  to 490)
because  of the  14.1?  fall  in the  world  price,  combined  with a long-run
supply  elasticity  slightly  larger  than  one.  The  outputs  of  Malaysia,
Indonesia  and  Oceania  fall  by about  50 percent  (a  combination  of the
14.1Z  fall  in  the  world  price,  a small  rise  in the  tax  rate  and  an
elasticity  of 3).18
World  output  rises  from  1633  to 1725 (by  5.72.  Hence  consumers
in  developed  countries  gain from  the  lower  world  price  and  higher
output. Africa's  output  under  existing  taxes  is 1032  and its  share  is
63.2  percent. Under  Nash  taxes,  Africa's  output  rises  to 1234  or by
19.6%,  and its  share  rises  to 71.5  percent,  or by 8.3  percentage  points.
One of the  concerns  for  Africa  has been  the  fall in its  share  of
world  cocoa  exports,  and  the  rise  in  the share  of  Malaysia  and
Indenesia. A Nash strategy  would  have resulted  in  a higher  share  for
Af:ica,  as  well as in a fall  in the  share  of  Malaysia  from  7.72  to 3.6Z,
and  in a fall  in the  share  of Indonesia  from  2.02 to 1.OZ.  Such  an
expansion  for  Africa  would  have  come  at the  cost  of lower  profits,
however.
Profits  under  Nash taxes,  in  millions  of US dollars,  increase  by
88 in  Ghana  (or  by over  202),  and  fall  by 202 (29Z)  in  COte  d'Ivoire,  by
99 (19.22)  in  Brazil,  by 29 (67.42)  in  Malaysia,  by 25 (16.5Z)  in
Ecuador,  by 20 in  Nigeria  (10Z),  by 13 (9.4Z)  in  Cameroon,  and  by about
8 (69.7Z)  in  Indonesia  and  Oceania  (70.72). Overall  profits  fall  by 315
or by 14.4  percent. Profits  in  Africa  fall  from  1443 to 1296  or  by 10.2
percent. Africa's  share  in  total  profits  rises  by three  perceatage
points  (from  66.5t  to  69.5).
The  beneficiaries  from  Nash  taxes  rath.r  than  actual  taxes  are  the
cocoa  consumers  and  Ghana,  while  the  other  producers  lose.  The  main
losers,  in terms  of the  proportional  fall  in  profits,  are  Oceania,
Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  Cote  d'Ivoire.
Government  revenues  increase  slightly  in  Ecuador,  Malaysia,
Indonesia  and  Oceania,  and  they  fall  everywhere  else.  They  fall  by 8719
percent  in Nigeria,  72 percent  in  Cameroon,  53  percent  in  Ghana,  46
percent  in Brazil  and  27 percent  in  C6te  d'Ivoire. The  proportional
fall  in revenues  is  directly  related  to the  reduction  in tax  rates.
These  results  are  preliminary.  Assuming  that  they  hold after
careful  econometric  analysis  is  done,  it  would  lead  us to conclude  that
when providing  policy  advice  to any  one  country  in the  case  of
commodities  such  as  cocoa,  the  various  bilateral  and  multilateral  donors
should  take  into  account  both  the  effect  on other  countries  as  well as
their  possible  reaction  to  the recommended  policy  change. This  would
help avoid  a  potentially  undesirable  outcome  such  as the  Nash solution
where  most countries  end  up  worse  off  despite  the  expectation  of a
welfare  improvement.  Even if some  countries  gain - such  as Ghana  in
this  case  - the  actual  gain  would  be substantially  lower  than  what  might
have been  expected  based  on the  assumption  that  myopic  taxes  in various
countries  are  mutually  consistent.
Joint  optimization  by cocoa  producers  would  of course  result  in
higher  taxes,  lower  output,  a  higher  world  price  and  higher  overall
profits. This st  ategy  is  not examined  in the  simulations  because  it
does  not  appear  to us to  be a sustainable  one.  Agricultural  commodities
differ  from  mineral  resources  (such  as oil) in  on important  respect.
The latter's  output  is  predictable,  while  output  of the former  is
volatile. It is  hard  to believe  that  a country  experiencing  a bumper
crop  will simply  accept  the  export  quota  determined  by the  joint
maximization  strategy. For  instance,  we saw  recently  that  even  with the
support  of the  consumer  countries,  the  International  Coffee  Agreement
fell  apart.20
2.  The  effects  of a 100,000  M.T. outward  shift  in Ghana's  supply
curve  under  both sets  of taxes  are  shown  in  Table  4.  The  difference  in
the  effects  of  actual  and  Nash taxes  in this  case  are  very similar  to
those  in the  original  case (Table  3).  Hence,  we first  compare  the
results  in the  original  case  and  in the  present  case  when actual  taxes
are  levied. The  comparison  of results  when Nash  taxes  are  used is
similar  and  is  briefly  discussed  later.
Clearly,  Ghana  gains  from  the  exogenous  productivity  increase.
Its  profits  rise  from  405  to 579 (see  column  5 in Tables  3  and 4)  under
actual  taxes. The  increased  productivity  in  Ghana  leads  to a fall  in
the  world  price,  from  2070  to 1993 (or  3.72).
The lower  world  price  implies  a loss  in  profits  in  all other
countries. The loss  is  56 in Cote  d'Ivoire  (8.Z),  28 in  Brazi.  (5.3X),
17 in  Cameroon  (12.32),  11 in Nigeria  (5.7Z),  7 in  Ecuador  (4.6Z),  9 in
Malaysia  (20.9Z),  2.7 in  Indonesia  (24.52)  and  3.3  in  Oceania  (302).
Interestingly,  the  overall  profits  for  the  nine countries  change
very little. They rise  only  from  2182  to 2222,  or  by 1.8  percent. In
other  words,  even though  Ghana  gains  from  the  increase  in its
productivity,  the  losses  by the  other  countries  are  such  that  overall
industry  profits  remain  practically  unchanged. Ghana  gains  174,  while
the  other  countries  lose  134,  so  that  overall  profits  increase  by 40.
Hence,  the  principal  gainers  from  Ghana's  increase  in  productivity  are
Ghana  and  the  consumers  who  benefit  from  a lower  price.
Africa's  profits  increase  from  1443  to 1533,  and  its  share  in
total  profits  rises  from  66.1  percent  to 69 percent. Non-Africa's21
profits  fall  from  739  to 689,  and its  share  falls  from  33.9  percent  to
31  percent.
The  lower  world  price  leads  to  a reduction  in  output  in  all
countries  except  Chana (given  the  unchanged  tax rates),  and  world  output
increases  by 26 (from  1633  to 1659,  see  column  3 in  Tables  3  and 4),
i.e.,  by one  quarter  of the  shift  in  Ghana's  supply  curve. Total
revenues  fall  for  all  countries  with positive  tax rates  other  than  Ghana
because  of a lower  output  and  lower  world  price.
Interestingly,  in the  case  of  Nash taxes,  producers  as a  whole  are
able to retain  more  profits  from  Ghana's  productivity  increase  than  in
the  case  of existing  taxes,  even  though  world  prices  are lower  in the
former  case.  Under  Nash  taxes  (see  column  6,  Tables  3 and  4),  overall
profits  rise  by 53.2 (from  1866.6  to 1919.8),  while  under  existing  taxes
(column  5,  Tables  3 and  4),  they  only  rise  by 40.  Also,  Nash tax  rates
in this  case  are similar  to those  in  the  original  case  for  all  countries
except  for  Ghana,  whose  Nash  tax  rate  increases  from  19.5  percent  to
23.5  percent.
In this  case,  under  existing  taxes,  Africa  as a  whole  gains  about
half (90)  of  what Ghana  gains (174),  while  all  producers  gain  about  23
percent  (40)  of  what  Ghana  gains. These  findings  are  again  preliminary.
If they  hold  under  closer  empirical  scrutiny  they  would lead  us to
conclude  that  when  considering  the financing  of investment  projects  in
commodities  such  as  cocoa,  bilateral  and  multilateral  donors  should  take
into  account  the  negative  impact  on the  other  producers. Moreover,
simultaneous  expansion  of output  in  several  countries  would  not generate
the  returns  on the  investment  projects  which  would  result  from  output22
expansion  in one  country  only. These  points  were raised  in  an a
somewhat  different  context  in  an early  paper  by Goreux  (1972).9 The
World  Bank  policy  of denying  lending  for  output  expansion  in  commodities
such  as cocoa  (except  in special  circumstances)  is  based  on the  above
considerations.
3.  The  effects  of a 100,000  M.T.  outward  shift  in  Malaysia's  supply
curve  are  quite  similar  to those  when the  shift  occurs  in  Ghana's  supply
curve,  and  are  shown  in Table  5.  In the  case  of existing  taxes,  the
effects  are identical  for  all  countries  other  thin  Ghana  and  Malaysia.
World  supply  in  both  cases  is 1659  and  the  world  price  is 1993.  In the
present  case,  Ghana's  profits  fall  from  405  to 380 (and  its  output  falls
form  219 to  213),  while  Malaysia's  profits  rise  from  43 to  123 (and  its
output  rises  from  125  to 211).
World  profits  are  lower  (2112)  in this  case than  in the  case  where
Ghana's  supply  shifts  outward  (2222). The reason  is that  in the  present
case,  Ghana's  output  is lower  (than  when the  supply  shift  occurs  in
Ghana)  by 100,  while  Malaysia's  output  is  higher  by 100 (see  Tables  4
and  5, column  3),  and  Ghana  is the  lower-cost  producer. As is shown  in
Table  1, at the  actual  outputs,  Ghana's  producer  price (P. marginal
cost)  is 621  while  that  of  Malaysia  is 2070.
In fact,  the  outward  shift  in  Malaysia's  supply  curve  leads  to
overall  immiserization  for  the  exporting  countries  as a  whole.  Total
profits  fall  to  2112,  compared  to 2182  in the  actual  case.  Hence,  even
9  Goreux  examined  the  returns  on  investment  projects  alternatively  from
the  viewpoint  of  the  firm,  of  the  investing  country,  of  all  producing
countries,  and  of the  world  as a  whole.23
though  Malaysia's  profits  rise  by almost  200  percent,  total  industry
profits  fall. Comparing  the  present  case  with that  when Ghana's  supply
shifts  outward  (with  world  output  and  price  being  the same  in  both
cases),  the  reason  for  which  profits  are  only  2112  rather  than  2222  is
that  a larger  share  of the  given  total  output  is  produced  by a higher-
cost  producer  (Malaysia)  rather  than  by a lower-cost  producer  (Ghana).
Africa's  profits  in this  case  are  1334  out  of a total  of 2112,  so
that  its  share  is 63.2  percent. That  compares  with the  higher  profits
(of  1443)  in  the  actual  case (and  a share  of 66.1Z),  and  profits  of 1533
(share  of 692)  when Ghana's  supply  curve  shifts  outward.
In the  case  of Nash  taxes,  tax  rates  in  the  present  case in  all
countries  other  than  Ghana  and  Malaysia  are  extremely  close  to the  tax
rates  when the supply  shift  occurs  in  Ghana. The  tax rates  for  Ghana
and  Malaysia  are  quite  different  in each  case.  In the  present  case,
Ghana's  Nash tax  rate  is  19.7  percent  and  that  of  Malaysia  is  6.6
percent. When  Ghana's  supply  shifts  outward,  the  Nash tax  rates  are
23.5  percent  for  Ghana (i.e.,  3.8  percentage  points  higher)  and 2.5
percent  for  Malaysia  (4.1  percentage  points  lower).
With  Nash taxes,  profits  for  all  countries  other  than  Ghana  and
Malaysia  are  extremely  close  in  both  cases. Malaysia's  profits  rise
from  10 (when  Ghana's  supply  shifts  outward)  to 70 in the  present  case,
while  Ghana's  profits  fall  from  631  to 463.  Total  industry  profits  in
the  present  case  are  1804.6  rather  than  1866.6  in  the  original  cae,
i.e.,  they  fall  by 62.  However,  with existing  taxes,  they fall  from
2182  to 2112  or by 70.  Hence,  the  use  of Nash  taxes  enables  the24
industry  as a  whole  to suffer  smaller  losses  from  the  supply  shift  than
with existing  taxes.
Thus,  Africa  as  well as the  industry  as a  whole loses  both  with
actual  and  Nash  taxes. This  would  seem  to reinforce  the  point  made
earlier  that  donors  should  take  into  account  the  interdependencies  among
producing  countries  when assessing  investment  projects.
4.  Up to  mid-1989,  the  Caisse  de Stabilisation  in the  CMte d'Ivoire
did  not  pass on the  significant  reduction  in  world  cocoa  prices  to its
producers. The  Caisse  was still  paying  the  producers  more than  the
price  it obtained  (net  of  marketing  costs). It  was  paying  400  CFA/MT,
implying  a cost  for  the  Caisse  of  well over  the  FOB  price  of 500  CFA/MT.
We simulate  the  reduction  in  COte  d'Ivoire's  export  tax  rate  by setting
it  equal  to  zero  and  keeping  the  tax  rates  of the  other  countries  at
their  initial  level. This  is shown  in  Table  6.
We notice  a dramatic  increase  in  CMte  d'Ivoire's  output,  from  585
to 739,  or by 26.3  percent. The  world  price  falls  from  2,070  to 1,905
or by 8 percent,  so that  all  ccuntries  other  than  COte  d'Ivoire  lose.
However,  COte  d'Ivoire  also loses  as its  profits  fall  from  698  to 629,
or by 10 percent. Hence,  the strategy  followed  by CMte  d'Ivoire  was
certainly  not optimal  from  its  own  viewpoint  (unless  the  Caisse  aimed  to
stabilize  the  producer  price  and  believed  that  the  changes  leading  to a
fall  in the  world  price  were transitory).  With its  large  share  in  the
world  market,  a zero  tax  rate  does  not  maximize  profits.25
5.  Finally,  we examine  the  impact  of the  three  previous  simulations
simultaneously,  i.e.,  a 100,000  M.T. supply  shift  in  Ghana  and  Malaysia
and  a zero  export  tax  rate  in  COte  d'Ivoire. The results  are shown  in
Table  7.  The  output  of Cote  d'Ivoire  rises  from  585  to 673  because  of
the  fall  in its  tax rate (but  rises  by less  than  under  the  previous
simulation),  and it rises  for  Ghana  and  Malaysia  because  of the  supply
shift. Output  falls  in  all  other  countries. Total  output  rises  from
1633  to 1732,  and  the  world  price  falls  from  2070  to  1754 (by  15.3Z).
Profits  fall  in  all  countries  except  Ghana  and  Malaysia. Total  profits
and  Africa's  profits  also  fall.
IV.  Concluding  Comments
The  results  presented  in  this  paper  are  preliminary. The  demand
and  supply  functions  were linearized  based  on  point  estimates  of the
relevant  parameters. The  exact  form  of these  functions  is  crucial  in
determining  the  equilibrium  tax  rates,  outputs,  profits  and  revenues.
In future  work,  we plan  to closely  examine  the  form  of the  relevant
functions.  We will also  examina  the  properties  of other  Nash
equilibria. These  include  revenue-maximizing  Nash taxes,  and  using
export  quotas  rather  than  the  export  tax  as the  policy  variable. Our
findings  so far  seem  to suggest  that  in  providing  policy  advice  and
support  of investment  projects  in the  case  of commodities  such  as cocoa,
the  donor  community  should  take  into  account  the  effects  on and  possible
reactions  of the  other  producing  countries.
For instance,  our  analysis  indicates  that  increasing  productivity
in one  African  country,  resulting  from  new investments,  would  benefit26
the  country  in question. The  other  African  countries  would lose.
However,  it  would  seem  that  the  Africar.  countries  as a  whole  would
benefit,  so  that  the  gains  to the  country  whose  output  expanded  would
dominate  the losses  for  the  other  countries. Hence,  the return  on the
new investments  would  be positive  for  Africa  as a  whole  but they  would
undoubtedly  be significantly  lower  than  for  the  country  in  question.27
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TABLE  1. BASIC  DATA
f  bi  cl
OUTPUT  OPUTPUT  SHARE  EXPORT  TAX  DOMESTIC  PRICE  ELASTICITY  SLOPE  INTERCEPT
(OOOM)  (%)  (%)  (US$/MT)  (OOOMT)
COTE  D'IVOIRE  650  35.8  25.1  1550  1.15  0.434  -87.7
GHANA  219  13.4  70.0  621  0.71  0.250  63.5
CAMEROON  118  7.2  40.0  1242  1.81  0.172  -95.6
NIGERIA  110  6.7  50.0  1035  0.45  0.048  60.5
MALAYSIA  125  7.7  0.0  2070  3.00  0.181  -250.0
INDONESIA  32  2.0  0.0  2070  3.00  0.048  -64.0
OCEANIA  30  1.8  0.0  2070  3.00  0.043  -60.0
ECUADOR  85  5.2  0.0  2070  0.28  0.011  61.2
BRAZIL  329  20.1  20.0  1656  0.58  0.115  138.2
(a) The non-iOu. aspectax rates me from iman  and DuncHan.  Table 7. page 21. a,  reotr 10 1982 and 198  (for Brazl).
fb) The  ongun  lstici  eskw  Brazil. Cole  dihlre.  and Maaysa weae  obtained  from Akyama and Bowers.  page 25.
They  apply  to  on-yew  peiod,  u  the ohigest  producwion  evels to  obtain thOS  vas.  We  assume  ltat  th
oslaicit  os  mIndones  and Oceania are equal to that at Malaya.  The otWe elastites  ate from Beotrman.
(c) The sope  is th  change  in metic  Ions for a one US dobar change  h  le  domestc producr  price.32
Table  2. Initial  Results  with  Actual  Taxes  and  Free  Trade..
Tax Rates  Output  Profit
(%)  (OOOMT)  (Millions  of
U.S. dollars)
Actual  Actua  Free  Traft  ULY&W  Ere  TradX
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Country
Cote  dIv.  25.1  585  590  698  401
Ghana  70.0  219  454  - 405  404
Cameroon  40.0  118  171  138  86
Nigeria  50.0  110  134  202  152
Africa  1032  1349  1443  1043
Malaysia  0.0  125  33  43  3
Indonesia  0.0  32  8  11  .7
Oceania  0.0  30  7  11  .6
Ecuador  0.0  85  78  151  109
Brazil  20.0  329  318  523  356
World  1633  1793  2182  1512.3
World Price (US.  dollars  /  WT?
Actual:  2,070
Free Trade:  1,562
1Profits  are  defined  to  include  producers'  surplus  and  government  revenue.
Actual  profits  are  derived  by  assuming  that  the calibrated  demand  and  supply
curves  are  true  demand  and  supply  curves.  These  profits  will  be  different  in
general  from  actual  observed  profits  (inclusive  of  tax  revenues).33
Table 3. Initial  Results  with Actual.  Nash and  Myogic  Tax Rates
Tax Rates  Output  Profit 1 Revenue
(8)  (  4OOOMT)  (Millions  of  (Millions  of
U.S.  dollars)  U.S.  dollars)
Actual  -Ash  MyoRic Actual Wah  Artual  Nash Mvoopic Actual  Nasih
(1)  (2)  (2')  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (6')  (7)  (8)
Cote d'Iv.  25.1  25.2  29.9  585  490  698  496  705  304  220
Ghana  70.0  19.5  20.5  219  421  405  493  544  318  146
Cameroon  40.0  8.2  9.8  118  184  138  125  172  98  27
Nigeria  50.0  5.7  6.3  110  139  202  182  221  114  14
Africa  1032  1234  1443  1296  834  407
Malaysia  0.0  2.8  5.1  125  63  43  14  44  0  3.2
Indonesia  0.0  0.7  1.2  32  17  11  3.4  11.3  0  .2
Oceania  0.0  0.6  1.3  30  16  11  3.2  11.1  0  .2
Ecuador  0.0  3.2  3.3  85  80  151  126  152  0  4.6
Brazil  20.0  13.4  14.7  329  315  523  424  525  136  75
World  1633  1725  2182  1866.6  970  490.2
World  Price (U.S.  dollars /  MT)
Actual:  2,070
Nash: 1,779
'Profits  are  defined  to  include  producers'  surplus  and  goverranent  revenue.
Actual  profits  are derived  by assuming  that the  calibrated  demand  and supply
curves  are true demand  and supply  curves. These profits  will be different  in
general  from  actual  observed  profits  (inclusive  of tax  revenues).34
Table  4. Increasing  Ghana's  Interreot  by lOO.OOOMT
Tax  Rates  Output  Profit  Revenue
(%)  (OOOMT)  (Millions  of  (Millions  of
U.S. dollars)  U.S. dollars)
Actual  Nash  Act&ual  Nash  Actual  kaSh  AStul  pash
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Countrv
Cote d'Iv.  25.1  25.3  560  470  642  460  280  205
Ghana  70.0  23.5  313  492  579  631  437  200
Cameroon  40.0  8.1  109  175  121  114  87  24
Nigeria  50.0  5.8  107  137  191  173  107  14
Africa  1089  1274  1533  1378  911  443
Malaysia  0.  2.5  111  53  34  10  0  2.3
Indonesia  0.0  0.6  28  15  8.3  2.5  0  .2
Oceania  0.0  0.6  26  14  7.7  2.3  0  .1
Ecuador  0.0  3.3  83  79  144  122  0  4.6
Brazil  20.0  13.7  322  309  495  405  128  73
World  1659  1744  2222  1919.8  1039.  523.2
World Price (U.S.  dollars  /  MT)
Actual: 1,993
Nash: 1,72235
Table 5. Increasing  Malaysia's  Intercept  by 100.OOOMT
Tax Rates  Output  Profit  Revenue
(%)  (OOOMT)  (Milllons  of  (Millions  of
U.S. dollars)  U.S. dollars)
Actual  Nash  Actual  Nash  Actual  Nash  Actual  Nash
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Country
Cote  d'Iv.  25.1  25.2  560  470  642  457  280  203
Ghana  70.0  19.7  213  408  380  463  297  138
Cameroon  40.0  8.1  109  174  121  113  87  24
Nigeria  50.0  5.8  107  136  191  172  107  14
Africa  989  1188  1334  1205  771  373
Malaysia  0.0  6.6  211  140  123  70  0  16
Indonesia  0.0  0.6  28  14  8.3  2.4  0  .1
Oceania  0.0  0.6  26  ;13  7.7  2.2  0  .1
Ecuador  0.0  3.3  83  79  144  121  0  4.5
Brazil  20.0  13.7  322  309  495  404  128  73
World  1659  1743  2112  1804.6  899.  467
World  Price  (U.S.  dollars  / MT)
Actual:  1,993
Nash:  1,71736
Table  6. Comraring  the  Initial  Eauilibrium  and the Effget  of
Fixing  Cote  dllvoire's  TAx at Zero.
Tax Rates  Output  Profit  Revenue
(M)  (OOOMT)  (Millions  of  (Millions  of
U.S. dollars)  U.S.  dollars)
Original  UN  Original  Hu  OrigiAnl  H-  Origenal  W
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Country
Cote  d'Iv.  25.1  0.0  585  739  698  629  304  0
Ghana  70.0  70.0  219  206  405  352  318  275
Cameroon  40.0  40.0  118  100  138  105  98  76
Nigeria  50.0  50.0  110  105  202  179  114  100
Africa  1032  1150  1443  1265  834  451
Malaysia  0.0  0.0  125  95  43  70  0  0
Indonesia  0.0  0.0  32  24  11  2.3  0  0
Oceania  0.0  0.0  30  22  11  2.1  0  0
Ecuador  0.0  0.0  85  82  151  120  0  0
Brazil  20.0  20.0  329  313  523  396  136  119
World  1633  1686  2182  1855.4  970  570
World Price  (U.S.  dollars  Z  MT)
Original:  2,070
New: 1,90537
Table  7.  Comsarina  the  Initial  Eguilibrium  and  the  Effect  o-
Fixing  Cote-d'Ivoire's  Tax  at  Zero  and  Increasina  the
Intercegts  of  Ghana  and  Malaysia  bX  00O,OQMT.
Tax  Rates  Output  Profit  Revenue
(%)  (QOONT)  (Millions  of  (Millions  of
U.S.  dollars)  U.S.  dollars)
Original  Utz  Original  New  Original  NM  Qriginal  egw
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Countr
Cote  d'Iv.  25.1  0.0  585  673  698  522  304  0
Ghana  70.0  70.0  219  295  405  483  318  362
Cameroon  40.0  40.0  118  84  138  80  98  59
Nigeria  50.0  50.0  110  102  202  160  114  89
Africa  1032 1154  1443  1245  834  510
Malaysia  0.0  0.0  125  167  43  77  0  0
Indonesia  0.0  0.0  32  17  11  3.0  0  0
Oceania  0.0  0.0  30  15  11  2.8  0  0
Ecuador  0.0  0.0  85  80  151  124  0  0
Brazil  20.0  20.0  329  299  523  412  136  105
World  1633 1732  2182 1863.8  970  615
World  Price  (U.S.  dollars  I  MT)
Original:  2,070
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